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Abstract 
While developmental neuroscience can often be motivated by clinical and policy 
concerns, its constituent research methodologies aim to provide insights into the 
limits and potential of the developing brain. Our article addresses two main 
approaches for characterizing psychological and neural changes that occur between 
infancy and adolescence. Specifically, with respect to psychological change, 
frequently debated topics such as the nature of developmental continuity can 
potentially gain from the insights of brain data. Whereas for neuroimaging 
approaches, which have gained substantial traction in recent years, the advances in 
describing the developing ‘connectome’ has been challenged by awareness of 
imaging artifacts related to behavioral aspects of development (such as motion). As 
these two fields (developmental psychology and neuroscience) continue to 
integrate by, for example, constraining psychological hypotheses with brain data 
and offering explanatory models of neuroimaging findings, the resolution of these 
challenges charts the development of the field itself.  
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Introduction 
Child development is characterized by significant changes across all domains of 
psychological functioning. Whereas it is evident that change occurs, how exactly it 
does so is much less clear and subject to continuous debates (Kagan, 1980). Thus, it 
remains an open question if the type of developmental process might be unique to a 
particular period or if it is shared with other later periods. For instance, is the way a 
young child tries to make sense of its social environment and understands the 
workings of other minds comparable to the way that an adolescent might perform 
such a feat? Thus, developmental process can occur through a series of distinct 
stages, each qualitatively different from one another or as a continuous process. For 
instances changes in verbal competence or social behavior could result from 
incremental steps in core abilities. This may differ depending on the phenomenon 
under investigation.  Addressing such a question poses major theoretical and 
methodological challenges to researchers, given that what is required are 
longitudinal designs with paradigms that capture the same ability to the same 
extent at various points in time, but still ultimately rely on a statistical relationship 
between two measures tapping into the same behavioural surface feature over 
time.  
The study of the developing brain has progressed owing to innovations in 
non-invasive neuroimaging technologies over the past two decades, enabling 
questions regarding the relation between child psychological and neural 
development to be investigated. Alongside the various longitudinal measures of 
developing brain anatomy and functional activation patterns relating to task 
performance is a rapidly emerging line of research into the human connectome 
(Sporns, Tononi, & Kotter, 2005) — or set of neural connections — and the changes 
it undergoes throughout development (Power, Fair, Schlaggar, & Petersen, 2010). 
Investigation of the developing connectome has pivoted developmental 
neuroscience from the conceptual framework of psychology and towards the 
analytic tools of network theory. Complementing psychological debates regarding 
the potentially divergent mechanisms underlying similar behaviors at various points 
in development, connectomic research unveils shifts in brain organization 
throughout childhood (Fair et al., 2009), requiring a novel understanding of how this 
dynamic functional anatomy is characterized. Just as it would be inaccurate to 
assume the same psychological mechanisms underlie corresponding faculties, 
current advances in developmental neuroscience pose a core challenge to the static 
notion of functional roles.  
The following paper takes the shifting terrain of developmental cognitive 
neuroscience as its starting point. We bring our complementary disciplinary 
foundations (developmental cognitive psychology and systems neuroscience) into 
dialogue to interrogate the current challenges facing our respective fields, their 
trajectories, and possibilities for jointly addressing research questions.  
Developmental Psychology 
We would like to begin by arguing that developmental cognitive neuroscience is in a 
unique position to contribute to psychological theory given that it provides evidence 
on the stability or variability of core neural mechanisms subserving specific 
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psychological functions. Arguably, the debate over the nature of change in 
development has raged most fiercely in the study of personality development over 
the lifespan (Caspi, Roberts, & Shiner, 2005). We will discuss this tenet with 
reference to another ability that has been at the center of this debate in child 
development, namely theory of mind (ToM). We will begin by outlining some basic 
and relevant theoretical concepts of developmental change.  This will be followed 
by the main theoretical controversies regarding developmental changes of ToM. A 
subsequent summary of neuroscientific findings in the field of ToM will set the stage 
for making a set of key predictions that would be able to provide evidence in favour 
of either one of the two positions on the nature of change in child development.  
On the nature of change in developmental psychology 
Continuity and discontinuity are two fundamental concepts of understanding and 
describing change in the course of human development (Emde & Harmon, 1984). In 
this context change refers to the emergence of new functions and abilities across 
cognitive or motor domains, such as the acquisition of object permanence, the 
ability to recognize one’s mirror image or learning to walk. A crucial question in this 
context is whether the change is fundamental and constitutes the substitution of an 
already acquired ability with a newly acquired one (i.e. crawling by walking) or 
rather entails the addition or modification of an already acquired ability (i.e. 
acquiring the accurate use of syntactic structures; Flavell, 1982; Kagan, 1981; 
Piaget, 1971). The work of Jean Piaget bears the hallmarks of someone arguing for 
connectivity of change, where the child’s interactions with the environment based 
on the present state of knowledge will lead to increased abstraction over a larger 
range of different contexts out of which new insight ultimately emerge as a 
constituent of a new developmental stage (Piaget, 1952). The influential work of 
attachment theorist John Bowlby suggests that the attachment styles are highly 
stable across the life-span (Bowlby, 1969), subject to relatively little change, and 
thus evidence for stability in important socio-affective functions (Waters, Merrick, 
Treboux, Crowell, & Albersheim, 2000). Others however have argued against the 
parsimony of developmental continuity (Kagan, 1980), making a case for the idea 
that notions of continuity are more parsimonious with the history of western 
thought and therefore more amenable as an interpretative heuristic when 
discussing the nature of change in human development (Kagan, 1980).In support of 
this, studies on changes in attachment style over the lifespan can be cited, whereby 
it has been shown that this occurred as a function of negative life events (Waters et 
al., 2000).  
 A crucial question in this discussion pertains to the kind of methodology and 
evidence required to allow making an inference on the nature of change. One key 
criticism levelled at developmental psychologists is the affinity to seeing 
relationships based on surface features of the studied behavior (Kagan, 1980). Thus, 
surface features such as correlations between two measures of the same construct 
at two time points suggestive of a stable relationship over time may provide only 
inadequate evidence on whether a skill at time point one is fundamentally the same 
at time point two, given the influence of unobserved latent variables. In fact, 
debates on the type of evidence required to decide on the nature of change 
frequently appear to end up in this impasse. We suggest that cognitive neuroscience 
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has much to offer by providing information on the similarity of the underlying neural 
mechanisms subserving specific cognitive functions. We make this case by 
discussing the literature on the development of theory of mind.  
 
Developmental change in theory of mind 
Normal human adults are able to attribute mental states to one another. This ability 
has also been referred to as possessing a theory of mind and has been the subject of 
intense and unabated scientific scrutiny for the last four decades (Dennett, 1978). 
Particularly the question how humans come to develop this capacity has played a 
dominant role in developmental cognitive psychology (Flavell, 1999; Saxe, Carey, & 
Kanwisher, 2004; Wimmer & Perner, 1983). The classic test of this ability in 
development is known as the false-belief task (Dennett, 1978; Wimmer & Perner, 
1983). In standard versions of this task, the child is told a story of a character whose 
belief about an object’s location is initially correct, but becomes false as a function 
of the object being moved without the character’s knowledge. For example, Sally 
has a ball and decides to put the ball into a basket. While Sally leaves the scene 
Anne decides to move the ball from the basket to a nearby box. Upon Sally’s return 
the child is asked where Sally will look for the ball. To accurately respond, the child, 
who knows where the ball is, has to track the beliefs of the character in question and 
simultaneously inhibit its own knowledge of where the desired object is hidden. 
Variants of this task abound and the findings converge that until around the age of 
four years children do not respond correctly to the question. As a result, it has been 
prominently argued, that between the age of 3-4 years children undergo a 
fundamental change in the concepts used to reason about and understand other 
minds and that such a now representational concept was absent until then (Flavell, 
1999; Perner, 1993; Saxe et al., 2004; Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001). Whereas 
credence is typically given to the development of potential precursors of a full-
fledged ToM, such as understanding other’s perceptions, emotions, desires and 
goals, these are argued to be functionally distinct (Saxe et al., 2004). The basic 
argument here is that the unique accomplishment of attributing mental states to 
others occurs as a function of a fundamental organizational change in the 
underlying cognitive architecture, giving rise to the child’s ability to posit a theory of 
other’s mental states (Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997).  
Such accounts have been questioned especially, because the high cognitive 
demands on executive functions and language comprehension may have masked 
the possession of theory of mind in younger children (Bloom & German, 2000). 
Thus, poor performance of younger children may not reflect the fundamental 
absence of a particular social ability per se, but result from inadequate skills 
required to perform on such tasks. In line with such proposals, recent studies have 
garnered evidence by means of so-called violation of expectation paradigms,  which 
show through recording looking times that infants as young as 15 months seem to 
have an understanding of others’ false-beliefs (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005). More 
recent and methodologically less contentious anticipatory looking paradigms have 
been able to buttress claims of early false-belief understanding in young infants 
(Southgate, Senju, & Csibra, 2007). By now there is a substantial amount of 
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evidence suggesting that children younger than four years are able to track others’ 
beliefs , culminating in the observation that seven-month old infants are already 
influenced by the beliefs of other agents in responding to the presence or absence 
of visual stimuli (Kovacs, Teglas, & Endress, 2010). Some would argue that there is 
no fundamental change around four years of age and that earlier versions provide 
the “conceptual foundation" for later abilities to reason about false-beliefs (e.g. 
early representational abilities in infants are built upon leading to a capacity for 
metarepresentation, forming the basis for a theory of mind; Leslie, 1987; Surian, 
Caldi, & Sperber, 2007) Others however question whether infants as young as 15 or 
even 7 months can already be said to be tracking other’s beliefs (Perner & Ruffman, 
2005), suggesting that instead infants assign a set of behavioural rules, which do not 
necessarily comprise a mediating mental state. To provide a reconciliation to these 
positions, it has been proposed recently that there might actually be two cognitive 
systems in place, one for tracking full-fledged beliefs and another tracking belief-
like states (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009; Rakoczy, 2012). Thus, the relationship 
between early and late competencies of ToM and if the two are the same, only 
partly so or fundamentally distinct continues to be controversial, while the type of 
evidence required to allow to argue for either remains opaque. Even though 
longitudinal data suggest that ontogenetically early and late false-belief 
competencies are linked (Thoermer, Sodian, Vuori, Perst, & Kristen, 2012) covarying 
changes in unobserved latent variables render this type of evidence as less than 
suitable to settle the debate. 
Using cognitive neuroscience for developmental cognitive theory 
The utility of cognitive neuroscience to reliably infer cognitive processes from the 
neuronal function of specific brain regions has made enormous progress. The fact 
that particular brain regions are functionally dedicated to perform specific cognitive 
computations is one of the basic assumptions of the present theoretical claim. This 
is substantiated byrecent developments in the analyses of large-scale data sets and 
across meta-analyses of studies, which allow for the reliable and consistent 
mapping of cognitive process with specific brain regions (Yarkoni, Poldrack, Nichols, 
Van Essen, & Wager, 2011). Thus, using both forward- and reverse inference it is 
possible to predict which brain regions are differentially recruited not just for lower 
level sensory processes such as pain processing, but also for higher-level cognitive 
and affective processes, such as working memory (Yarkoni et al., 2011). In the case 
of theory of mind there is by now an abundance of studies implicating a 
circumscribed network of brain regions required for tracking and computing others’ 
beliefs in adults. These include the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), the bilateral 
temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), the superior temporal sulcus (STS) as well as the 
temporal pole (TP; Frith & Frith, 2003). Recent attempts have been made to 
decompose this network into the subcomponential processes required for belief 
attribution (i.e. representing other’s belief, decoupling own belief from that of 
others, inhibiting own belief; Frith & Frith, 2003). Thus, some have argued for a 
unique role of TPJ in representing others’ beliefs (Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003), while 
this has been contended by others (Mitchell, 2008). Regardless of the precise role of 
specific brain regions in the context of mental state attribution, there is by now solid 
evidence in support of a network of regions reliably activated when making 
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inferences of others mental states .(Bzdok et al., 2012; Schurz, Radua, Aichhorn, 
Richlan, & Perner, 2014).  
Such a persistent association of a circumscribed set of brain regions with a 
specific cognitive function allows for making predictions over the course of 
development, because accounts of developmental continuity and discontinuity 
would make different predictions with which brain areas ought to be observed over 
time. Developmental continuity of theory of mind would predict that core processes 
are the same over development, whereas developmental discontinuity states that 
these differ and change so fundamentally as to be represented in a qualitatively 
different manner. Thus, if a function develops continuously the same brain regions 
should be implicated at the various time points, whereas if development occurs 
discontinuously, this should manifest itself in a different set of brain regions. Recent 
findings from resting-state analyses in both adults and children exemplify this point 
perfectly by showing that neural networks typically associated with TOM are 
present to a comparable extent in children aged 6 to 12 years and adults (Steinbeis, 
Bernhardt, & Singer, in press). These findings are complemented by behavioral 
findings of a continuity of TOM development from child- to adulthood starting at 6 
years of age in that adults and older children were shown to find it as difficult as 
younger children to process an agent’s false belief compared to a true belief 
(Apperly, Warren, Andrews, Grant, & Todd, 2011). Relating this back to our initial 
example of ToM development, if like many developmental cognitive psychologists 
believe that a full-fledged theory of mind emerges uniquely around the age of four 
years and is fundamentally different to any such ability shown at younger ages, 
different brain regions should be associated with the two abilities. If however, the 
change from early abilities of attributing belief-like states were a functional 
antecedent to the fully developed theory of mind, we would expect to see this 
become evident in the recruitment of the same brain regions.   
There are of course some caveats that are important to bear in mind with 
such an approach. For instance, the possibility of age-related changes in the cortical 
representation of the same cognitive function may lead to different brain regions 
subserving the same process over time. This constraint implies that cognitive 
neuroscience would only be able to inform on whether the neurocognitive 
development of theory of mind abilities is continuous (i.e. the same brain region 
subserves theory of mind performance at both time points). Nonetheless, our 
reasoning suggests, that cognitive neuroscience is in a unique position to offer the 
kind of evidence required to settle the debate on whether early competencies in 
theory of mind are linked not just at a surface level but at a deep structural level 
indicative of shared cognitive processes.  
The Developing Connectome 
Task-related activation provides one means for assessing the trajectory of 
alterations in brain function. The connectomic approach offers another means 
based on the relationship between connectivity and function. In order to study 
developmental changes in brain function, the premise of this line of research is that 
functional changes can be inferred from unique patterns of connectivity.  
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Rather than describe the merits and costs of this approach, we offer an overview of 
the novel methods and findings related to characterizing changes during 
development using maps of connectivity. A method termed resting-state fMRI, in 
particular, has gained prominence for its ease of acquisition and flexibility in post 
hoc analyses. Based in the correlation of spontaneous intrinsic brain activity, 
resting-state fMRI offers a means to describe the functional connectivity throughout 
the brain using as little as five minutes of data acquisition time. When considering 
the particular challenges of the MRI scanning environment — especially the 
requirement to remain absolutely still throughout the duration of the scan — the 
short scan time provides a significant advantage in studying children. 
The literature addressing connectome development in childhood ranges in scope 
from addressing alterations in specific cognitively-defined networks, to attempts to 
generalize principles of brain organization using techniques from graph theory. For 
example, in a series of publications by Damian Fair and colleagues, the research 
agenda shifts from being strongly rooted in cognitive developmental models, and 
investigating their corresponding control (Fair et al., 2007) and default-mode 
networks (Fair et al., 2008),  to more network theory-based abstractions that 
describe development as a local–to–distributed developmental shift in network 
organization (Fair et al., 2009). In readdressing our question of developmental 
trajectories, here with respect to network models of brain organization, it has the 
potential to inform psychological questions for understanding the time course of 
network alterations. 
Predicting age 
Similar conceptual shifts that allow the network, rather than the cognitive models 
themselves, to constitute the basis of developmental cognitive neuroscience have 
been further underlined by aims to predict age, rather than to describe it, using 
brain connectivity. While previous attempts to predict diagnostic categories from 
functional connectivity data — most notably with the outcome of the ADHD-200 
competition to predict attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder subtypes — 
demonstrated far less then optimal performance of current machine learning 
algorithms, the prediction of chronological age has proven more effective. The 
watershed study to describe the prediction of age using functional connectivity data 
coined this normative arc as the “functional brain maturation curve” (Dosenbach et 
al., 2010). While not the first study to describe various linear and higher order 
relationships between network organization and age (e.g., Kelly et al., 2009; Zuo et 
al., 2010), framing the metric as predictive transferred the status from experimental 
to clinically relevant.  
Methodological controversy has arisen regarding the validity of these findings for 
describing actual brain connectivity in developmental studies (Power, Barnes, 
Snyder, Schlaggar, & Petersen, 2012). The core issue relates to the effect of motion 
on functional connectivity measures, which can artifactually decrease the strength 
of long-distance connections and increase those of short-distances. While 
numerous studies over the past two years have debated the true motion-related 
impact on various group-difference and developmental studies, the correlation 
between childhood age and the ability to remain still in the scanner environment is 
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without question. As long-distance connections form the network nodes of the 
networks largely implicated in developmental studies, the motion effects on long-
distance anterior-posterior cortical networks are particularly challenging to current 
findings.  
Integrating developmental connectomics and cognitive psychology 
One prominent theory of the developmental relationships between connectomic 
and functional organization is the theory of neural constructivism, which argues that 
cognitive improvements result from greater connectivity between increasingly 
functionally specialized areas during development (Stevens, 2009). While this offers 
an explanation for lower-level sensory specialization, the developmental changes in 
cognitive faculties, such as ToM, would need to recruit additional systems in a 
context dependent and flexible manner. As neural constructivism does not account 
for this prolonged possibility for system-wide flexibility, it would be necessary to 
integrate theories of flexible and context-dependent functional integration to the 
neural constructivist model. The functional connectivity methods described above 
would be optimal for describing the neural substrates of cognitive development by 
offering information for how and why network alterations promote optimal 
cognitive abilities throughout development.  
In addressing the development of ToM, though no focused study yet exists, several 
functional connectivity findings provide insight into related network alterations. 
Medial prefrontal cortex is implicated in functions related to social cognition, and its 
investigation provides one means of assessing connectivity changes related to an 
aspect of ToM. Kelly et al. (2009) found that a related area of the perigenual 
cingulate demonstrates its long-distance connections latest in development from 
childhood to early adulthood when compared to other areas of the anterior 
cingulate. Furthermore, the specific connectivity that develops is consistent with 
the areas of the ToM-related network.  
Of course, given that mere behavioural observations to resolve questions on 
developmental continuity were critiqued on methodological grounds, we must be 
equally rigorous with the present approach. First, developmental imaging is a 
challenge no matter what the age group or phenomenon under investigation. 
However, this challenge increases considerably the younger the participants, but 
even for children as young as 24 months, this is not impossible. Whereas acquiring 
task-related functional activation for children that young is unrealistic, task 
performance can be related to task-free resting state functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (rs-fMRI) connectivity as well as structural imaging. Thus 
parameters such as degree centrality and functional connectivity in rs-fMRI and 
cortical thickness and structural covariance as well as fibre anisotropy and diffusivity 
provide excellent measures of the functional relevance of specific brain regions in 
the performance of a particular task. Degree centrality of a specific brain region for 
instance can provide information on the importance of a brain region within a 
hierarchical cluster of connected brain regions. Thus, one pattern of continuous 
development of theory of mind associated brain regions could be a correlation in 
degree centrality of mPFC or TPJ with performance on non-verbal tasks of ToM 
abilities, which would persist at a later time point with performance on verbal and 
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explicit tasks of ToM abilities. Importantly, concepts of continuous development of 
addition and modification would not preclude slight age-related changes in the 
topology of the functional network within which brain regions that are both 
associated with ToM abilities and possess high functional degree centrality are 
embedded. As long as certain core features are retained, this should be taken as an 
indicator of developmental continuity.   
 
Conclusion 
It is often asked how exactly brain imaging methodologies can inform psychological 
theory, given the considerable costs associated with measurement, data storage 
and processing. We have tried to outline one specific case where cognitive 
neuroscience can be informative over and above behavioural paradigms on topics 
that are central to theories of cognitive development. Thus, developmental 
neuroscience can carve out a unique position in being able to inform on issues 
related to the mechanisms and nature of change.   
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